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LAND, NOBLE AND RULER IN MUGHAL INDIA 
M.N. Pearson 
Introduction This contribution to the conference on 'Feudalism: 
a comparative study in social and political structures of pre-modern 
societies' makes almost no overt attempt to enter the continuing 
debate over the applicability of European feudal models to 
pre-British Indian society. Nevertheless, several of Bloch's themes 
in his classic statement have struck sympathetic chords. There 
is first what I take t9 be his general concern, which is to analyse 
the social order of feudal Europe, and the nature of social ties 
and social classifications within this order. In these matters not 
only military, legal and institutional matters are of interest, for 
he includes a discussion of ideas, of the 'medieval mentality'. 
What follows is a modest, preliminary, and very imperfect 
attempt at a holistic description of the Mughal polity. I am not 
trying to fit Mughal India into a feudal European 'box', either 
in the sense that feudal was used by Bloch and his many followers, 
or in a Marxist sense. Eric Wolf has recently reminded us of the 
dangers of the latter approach. He finds only three modes of 
production: capitalist, tributary and kin-based. Included in the 
second are states with strong centres, as well as weaker states, 
the former often being known as an Asiatic mode, and the latter 
as feudal. These are, however, 'oscillations within the continum 
of a single mode'. 'Reification of "feudalism" into a separate 
mode of production merely converts a short period of European 
history into a type case against which all other "feudal-like" 
phenomena must be measured. The concept of the Asiatic mode 
of production, in which a centralized state bureaucracy domina~es 
unchanging village communities of hapless peasants, similarly 
suffers from an ahistorical and ideological reading of Asian 
history') 
The same problems arise if one takes implicit theory and models 
unmodified from Bloch and his Annalist followers. Their concepts 
are usually derived solely from the European experience, and 
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most often apply only to Europe. When they venture beyond Europe, 
as does F. Braude!, this Eurocentrism becomes glaringly and 
painfully apparent. 
A collection of essays edited by Richard Fox demonstrates 
(inadvertently) the problems very clearly.2 It includes Burton 
Stein's attempt to fit the Colas into Southall's segmentary state 
box. It appears that with a little pushing and shoving they can 
be squeezed in. It would need an expert on South Indian history 
to evaluate the validity of the encapsulation, but two general 
points can be made. First, and positively, it is more fruitful than 
now discarded aristocratic or bureaucratic models. Nevertheless, 
the trumpeting in this book which accompanies their discovery 
that premodern Indian states were not like modern nation states 
arouses in me at least an acute sense of deja vu. Second, the 
question which has to be posed in response to Stein, is so what, 
or why bother'? Does his finding that the Colas were segmentary, 
even if 'true', advance usefully our knowledge of this state, or 
any other premodern one, in India? This point is particularly 
important because Stein at times so far forgets himself as to 
talk of 'medieval Indian' states, not just the Colas. I would suggest 
that it is one thing to use for what they are worth concepts and 
ideas from other social science research, but to place (or force) 
a whole structure derived from a very different society onto an 
Indian state seems perilous and ultimately not very useful. 
There are two, related, ways forward. First, a prime fault 
of the Fox book is that it ignores almost entirely Islamic states 
in India. Thus Fox quotes various critiques of Wittfogel's model, 
but not the only one (that by lrfan Habib)3 which considers it 
in a specifically premodern Indian context. This is scandalous, 
for Muslims ruled large parts of premodern India for long periods 
(600 years in the Doab). In these states people and ideas from 
the Islamic heartland were influential. Thus the recent very 
interesting work on Islamic states and government structures 
is useful. A short list of some of the subjects currently under 
discussion should bear this out. There is first the concept of fitness 
as a criterion for holding office, of obvious significance in Mughal 
succession disputes. The notion of the amirate by seizure relates 
to wider concepts of the attitudes of the ulama to government, 
and to the perpetuation of Mughal prestige and status into the 
nineteenth century. 
At a more philosophical level, the consensus seems to be that 
the ulama, at least the best ones, were profoundly suspicious of 
secular government per se. Government, as in some other societies, 
was seen as a regrettable necessity, the only way to avoid imperfect 
man's innate propensity to anarchy. Al-Ghazzali himself quoted 
a hadith which had Muhammad saying 'The best princes are those 
whom the ulama visit. and the worst ulama are those who visit 
princes'. Even more pithily, al-Ghazzali wrote 'We know it is 
not allowed to feed on a dead animal; still it would be worse to 
die of hunger•.4 The basic point is simply that Islamic political 
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theory and practice certainly contributed to the 'mentalities' 
of the Mughals and other Indian Muslim rulers, and must, along 
with recent research on the Islamic heartland, be used to illuminate 
our studies of Indian Muslim politics and society. 
One crucial advantage in doing this is that instead of using 
African or European models we will be using indigenous ones. 
This, then; is the way forward, and Ron Inden's work has already 
provided us with an example of what can be done. Inden, it is 
true, uses and acknowledges extra-Indian theory, but what he 
has achieved is essentially to generate powerful social science 
theory, and explanations of change, out of indigenous Hindu 
materials. As he says, in his sources 'are descriptions and 
explanations not of day-to-day events but of the major structural 
transformations that occurred over time in Bengali Hindu society. 
Even more important, these views of how and why changes took 
place in the past informed the actions of those who knew them•.5 
I would argue that whether or not he is 'right' is not the important 
issue. His contribution is to show that native sources can provide 
adequate theory to explain change in Indian society. His own 
work deals with Hindu society; Muslim India awaits our attention. 
One final point concerning theory must be stressed again. 
I am in no way advocating parochial, or totally Indian-specific, 
theory. Quite the reverse, as will be demonstrated, at least 
implicitly, in what follows. We should remember that Inden was 
powerfully influenced by extra-Indian theory, notably the kinship 
models of David M. Schneider. In essence I am advocating the 
widest possible reading of, and use of, theory of all sorts to write 
history thoroughly grounded in the experience and culture of India. 
What I oppose is attempts to squeeze Indian reality into ill-fitting 
theoretical strait-jackets formulated in other times and other 
places. In what follows I attempt to investigate social and 
especially political structures in Mughal India, stressing both 
synchronic and diachronic aspects. 
Land The general consensus of opinion sees the Mughal state 
as rather limited in its functions: to protect the land and Islam, 
and in return to take revenue from the subjects. The Mughals 
themselves fostered this view, for Abul Fazl describes the role 
of a king in very restricted and nebulous terms: he should preserve 
harmony and justice, stop conflict, and establish law and order. 6 
I consider this to be more normative than practical, for I will 
argue at the end of this paper that in fact the Mughals had much 
wider aspirations than this. But even the normative texts say 
the ruler should be intent on conquest of land. The results of 
this conquest require a little more analysis, for this touches on 
the question of land ownership. 
As Habib has shown, in Mughal India there was no idea of land 
ownership in any western sense by the state or the king. Land 
revenue was not a rent paid by a landholder because he was using 
royal property. Rather, at least in theory, he paid it as, in Abul 
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Fazl's terms, 'remuneration of sovereignty ' in return for the 
protection and justice provided by the king.1 There was private 
transferable property in urban areas, and saleable rights over 
land and its occupancy in rural India. This was not, however, 
land as private property in any European sense. In Europe in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries land and many other resources 
were increasingly 
becoming private property, and private property was 
becoming an individual right unlimited in amount, 
unconditional on the performance of social functions, and 
freely transferable, as it substantially remains today.8 
Hence the confusion of the early Europeans, and many later ones 
too, when they got to India. Finding, they thought, land not capable 
of being sold or mortgaged, and noting frequent transfers of jagirs 
(assigned land), they waxed lyrical on the autocratic evils of Mughal 
government as com~ared with the supposed benefits of 
contemporary Europe. This different concept of land, in 
combination with the admitted prevalence of official extortion, 
even led some to talk of a rule of escheat in Mughal India. 
The question of land ownership is not in fact a very useful 
one, for the Mughals wanted not ownership but control, specifically 
control over extraction of the surplus product from the land. To 
achieve this they needed power (which in India consisted of control 
over resources, especially land and the people on it) not ownership, 
and indeed we will argue that the main thrust of their policy was 
to extend this power, reduce the role of some intermediaries in 
the hierarchy of extraction, and so have for themselves more 
and more of the surplus. But this ultimate aim was not achieved; 
it remained only an aspiration, for various intermediaries, both 
zamindars (landholders) and mansabdars (office holders), had rights 
and interests which they could and did defend. 
Habib claims that nearly all the surplus produce of the empire 
went to the state: the state was the main agent of exploitation.lO 
This raises several points. First, it seems to ignore the amounts 
siphoned off by various layers of zamindars, who cannot be 
considered part of the state. Second, the state was not monolithic. 
There were various tensions and interests which divided king and 
noble, and factions within the nobility. Third, we obviously need 
to know what was done with this surplus. Moreland made much 
of the waste and profligacy of the Mughal elite, as compared 
with the rectitude and propensity to save exhibited by the Indian 
Civil Service of his day. Recent research however tends to show 
that the enormous salaries of the top nobility, which Moreland 
stressed so much and compared so scathingly with the modest 
remuneration of comparable British officials,ll went mostly on 
military necessities. The best summary, which draws partly on 
work by A. Jan Qaisar, is in an article by Irfan Habib. He finds 
about two-thirds of a noble's salary going to meet the cost of 
the military contingent he was required to have available. 
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Deducting other minor expenses, a noble had perhaps one-quarter 
of his total salary available for living expenses, and much of this 
was in any case spent in a way which generated production, albeit 
of luxury goods.12 I have no desire to defend the truly· colossal 
Mughal expenditure on military matters, but the point is that 
this was not the sort of wasteful expenditure which Moreland 
and many later followers stigmatized. Nor, incidentally, is it 
any longer so certain that the nobles were so extravagant that, 
despite their huge salaries, they frequently died in debt.l3 The 
evidence is far from conclusive, but some nobles at least left 
large estates.l4 
Many writers have pointed to, and anathematized, Mughal 
expenditure on tombs and palaces while the bulk of the population 
hovered near starvation.l5 In fact, the best known and most 
expensive of all Mughal buildings, the Taj Mahal, took seventeen 
years to build, and cost a reputed Rs. 185 lakhs. The total revenue 
of the empire in 1647 was Rs. 22 crores.l6 Thus for each year 
of its construction the Taj took only 0.5 percent of the total revenue 
of the empire. 
To talk of land only as something which created a surplus to 
be spent, whether wisely or not, is to do the Mughals and their 
nobles an injustice, for land was not only of economic importance. 
Control of land involved prestige and status, most clearly seen 
in comparison with sea and water. Only silly merchants went 
around in boats, like worms clinging to a log. A noble was fittingly 
employed galloping over the plain with his troops. The emperors 
roamed widely over their land. Indeed, S. Blake's work shows 
their capital to be not fixed, but located wherever on their land 
they happened to be.l7 Their peripatetic travels combined several 
motives - demonstration of power, training for the army, supervision 
of the process of surplus extraction, recreation - but not least 
was simply the desire, even need, to see and feel physically, even 
sensually, the land. Hence the lingering, even passionate, 
descriptions of land and its products in the memoirs of both Babur 
and Jahangir, and in the Ain-i Akbari.l8 
The economic, and also semi-mystical, nature of land is revealed 
in Mughal attitudes to plunder. They looted and plundered areas 
where they were only raiding and, to their regr·et, had no intention 
of staying. Such behaviour they saw as being the ultimate challenge 
and insult to an enemy. Mahmud of Ghazni was only the first 
of many Muslim rulers who appreciated that the best way to rub 
a neighbour's nose in the dirt of his inferiority was to raid and 
plunder over his land. Concerning the first Muslim raid into Gujarat, 
in 1299, Misra comments, 'And as the immediate object of the 
Turkish leaders was not immediate conquest, they allowed their 
soldiers to gorge themselves to the full.' But when they came 
back in 1305 to conquer the soldiers did not sack and destroy.l9 
The economic reason for this was clearly set out by Jai Singh 
in 1666. In combination with Sivaji his imperial army had looted 
and destroyed Bijapur. The unfortunate consequences were, as 
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he pointed out in a letter to Aurangzeb, that 'when there is no 
possibility of the lands being populated for three years at least, 
how can people agree to come to that side [that is, to desert Bijapur 
and join the Mughals] in the hope of getting the jagirs?r20 But 
attitudes to land were not solely economic. Land which was 
plundered was not just unproductive; it had been violated. To 
destroy land and things on it was_ not only to destroy resources, 
it was almost an unnatural act. 
It must be stressed that all land was not the same. Fertile 
land, populated by fat meek peasants, was clearly different from 
arid, infertile, or mountainous areas, both because of the differing 
possibilities for surplus extraction and because one was pleasant 
to the eye and mind, the other not. Ibn Khaldun saw a key 
relationship in Islamic societies as that between tribal raiders 
from the highlands and settled agriculturalists on the plains. In 
India this notion seems to apply particularly in Gujarat, but could 
have application elsewhere in the empire, such as the Punjab, 
except that here the raiders came from the desert. Related to 
this is Schwartzberg's finding that from late Sultanate times many 
former islands of settlement in India were joined and integrated.21 
lf so, the resultant tensions await further research. The Mughals 
did, at least, differentiate in their revenue schedules between 
different sorts of land and crops. Indeed they even, realistically, 
divided up land according to the degree of submission of its 
inhabitants. The three divisions were zor talab (seditious), medium, 
and raiyati (submissive). Areas were assigned in accordance with 
the presumed military capacity of the jagirdar (assignment-holder) 
concerned. A governor got as jagir land which was one quarter 
zor talab and three quarters medium. At the other extreme, small 
mansabdars got one quarter medium and three quarters raiyati.22 
Political and military factors could tie in with fertility and 
peasant submission to produce varying perceptions of land. Misra 
and others have noted how control, and attitudes to land, varied 
according to distance from the centre of the empire. For the 
Mughals the area of prime concern was the Doab, the subas 
(provinces) of Delhi, Agra, Oudh and Allahabad. In this area Mughal 
prestige was inextricably connected with land control. Here central 
authority had to be strong, and tax collection rigorous. Here 
was where khalisa (crown) land was likely to be found, or princes 
to hold their jagirs. A.R. Khan finds 61 chiefs holding mansabs 
(ranks) of 200 or more under Akbar. Of these men with 
quasi-independent power bases, only four came from the 
heartland,23 for the Mughals were reluctant to allow any control 
other than their own in this area. 
Zamindars It is something of a cliche that Mughal expansion 
was aimed primarily at extending horizontal control over land, 
not at achieving deeper vertical penetration into society. As 
we will see, Mughal efforts to achieve more power rJsually did 
not affect the lowest levels, but the point needs to be elaborated 
in order that it will be clear exactly which levels in society are 
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under discussion later. Most of the land in the empire was either 
jagir (assigned) land, or khalisa (crown) land. The Mughal nobility 
(mansabdars) were usually paid by means of these jagirs; they 
could be moved from one to another at the will of the emperor. 
Less than one-fifth of them were also zamindars (landholders) 
who had hereditary control over an area of land separate from 
their, or someone else's, jagir. These people, the chiefs, constitute 
the first of Nurul Hasan's useful three-way division of zamindars 
in the empire. Below the chiefs were the intermediary zamindars, 
basically revenue collectors known as desais, desmukhs, or 
chaudhuris, and usually having local kin or caste connections. 
At the bottom were primary zamindars, peasant land holders, 
including holders of one or more villages. There are various 
complications to this simple schema. Thus primary zamindars 
controlled at the local level virtually all land in the empire, while 
chiefs of course did not. A zamindar could be primary in one 
place and intermediary in another. Nor are the categories really 
completely discrete. A more accurate depiction would show a 
continuum of zamindars ranging in power from the top Rajput 
to the lowliest peasant holder, with all those holding rights over 
land fitting in somewhere.24 
Revenue was collected, and immediate control exercised, 
through the intermediary zamindars. The chiefs were a different 
problem, and will be considered shortly. As for the lowest level, 
a peasant's contact with the state (remembering that this is a 
very limited conception) was at best spasmodic, as when the 
imperial elephants trampled his crops. Usually he had nothing 
to do with it, far less the lumpen rural proletariat below him, 
the tenants and landless labourers. 
Government relations with the intermediary zamindars were 
not static. The Mughal administration connected with them, 
encouraging them to pay revenue and control the populace. In 
khalisa land this was the prime relationship. In the hereditary 
domains of the chiefs, imperial authority was much less in evidence, 
while in the majority of the empire, that assigned as jagirs, agents 
of the jagirdar worked alongside the imperial officials to collect 
the revenue which made up their master's pay. Given this structure, 
there were two distinct ways in which a ruler could extend his 
control. He could reduce the role of the zamindars, especially 
the intermediaries, and send his officials down to a lower level. 
Second, the ruler could reduce the power of, or even remove, 
the jagirdars, and turn his administrators into a totally salaried 
class, paid from a central treasury which derived most of its funds 
from land which was now all khalisa. 
The first method, obviously a root and branch change, was 
seldom attempted, and was never successful. In the early fourteenth 
century the idiosyncratic Muhammad bin Tughluq tried to send 
state power down even to the village level in the Doab. He found 
that he could destroy a village, but not create one, remove an 
intermediary zamindar but not replace him.25 Indeed his attempts 
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were typically aberrant, for no other Muslim Indian ruler seems 
to have attempted this. This was wise, for the intermediaries, 
bolstered by local knowledge and power, were virtually 
irreplaceable. Their kin, caste and lineage connections could 
extend horizontally over a considerable area, making them 
formidable opponents. Most rulers perforce came to terms with 
them and trod lightly. In 1563 Bijapur conquered the fertile Raichur 
doab from Vijayanagar, and then set about trying to replace the 
Kannada nayaks who had worked for Vijayanagar with Bijapuri 
nobles, thus making the land into jagirs. This effort succeeded 
only in the most militarily accessible areas. In the rest the nayaks 
remained. One local nayak 'received' h.is own villages from the 
king of Bijapur, and then appointed his own administrators. The 
only real change was that he might, if pressed, pay tribute from 
time to time.2o 
Such intermediaries were capable of causing endless trouble. 
Sinha's study of the heartland suba of Allahabad finds numerous 
'rebellions' by intermediary zamindars and small chiefs. Many 
areas and zamindars were zor talab (seditious), and others were 
listed as mashrutshuda, turbulent. Yet ultimately these zamindars 
operated from a weak base. In military terms they were no match 
for the Mughal armies. Final power rested with the imperialists; 
intermediary zamindars could be a nuisance, but nothing more. 
Unlike the nobles they had nowhere else to go. Their power and 
authority was based on their own local hereditary position. As 
such they had to be at least passively loyal to whomever was in 
power at the capital. A noble could be footloose as a last resort, 
for he had no landed base, but an interm_ediary zamindar did.27 
It would, in any case, be a mistake to see these intermediary 
zamindars as being continually pressed by the state. Most medieval 
Indian Muslim states lacked the power, and apparently the desire, 
to control let alone replace them. More typical was a modus 
vivendi where conflict and competition and contact took place 
primarily over the amount of land revenue to be paid. An 
intermediary in the heartland might be held to a commission of 
five or ten percent, but even there, given a limited number of 
officials, amounts payable were subject to haggling. In remote 
areas land revenue gave way to tribute collected when opportunity. 
offered. The Mughals did not attempt much in the way of vertical 
penetration, and did not try to replace these intermediary 
zamindars. For the Mughals the real political action lay in relations 
with the nobles and chiefs. If less of the surplus went to them 
there would be more for the ruler. The nobles and chiefs, not 
the intractable intermediary zamindars, represented the soft 
area which might yield to Mughal probing. 
Ruler and Noble We have now to consider general Mughal relations 
with the nobles and chiefs (or top level zamindars) of the empire. 
There were here some problems and opportunities which were 
common to nobles and chiefs, and some which were peculiar to 
chiefs, for only these latter rivalled the Mughals as ultimate holders 
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of land. In this section we will consider on-going relations with 
nobles, and in the next with chiefs, both these sections being 
primarily synchronic. The last section, more diachronic, will 
analyze briefer and more unusual Mughal thrusts. 
The jagir system, in which nobles collected their pay by being 
assigned an area of land from which they collected the land revenue, 
involved constraints and checks going both ways. Some of these 
are illusfrated in the system of transferring nobles, so that they 
drew their salaries, and held positions, in the same area for only 
a few years. The rationale for this was sound. A noble left alone 
to collect revenue in an area where he was also perhaps the main 
imperial official would rapidly build up local ties and strengths, 
and would be tempted to disobey imperial authority, especially 
if this appeared to be weakening. This tendency to fissiparousness 
had indeed appeared time and time again in the iqta system of 
other Islamic lands. The Mughals thus introduced transfers. Two 
disadvantages followed. The standard British critique, sometimes 
based on contemporary evidence, was that this made the jagirdars 
rapacious. They went into a jagir aiming to squeeze all they could 
out of it before the inevitable transfer. They had no interest 
in long term economic development. This does not really seem 
to have been a major problem, at least while the empire was 
functioning smoothly. The system of parallel officials, one group 
working for the empire and one for the jagirdar, and the 
overwhelming power and prestige of the emperor combined to 
keep extortion within acceptable, even predictable, bounds. 
A larger problem was that, unlike the various zamindars and 
chiefs, the jagirdars had no permanent stake in any part of the 
country. This decreased their propensity to defend an area they 
could not see as 'theirs.• One solution was that tried by Aurangzeb 
late in his reign when the Deccan wars were going badly. He 
insisted that all mansabdars fighting in the south have their jagirs 
there too. Yet it was a delicate equation, for transfers also, as 
intended, reduced a noble's power vis a vis the ruler. As we shall 
see, the Mughals apparently wanted to reduce the jagirdars even 
further, but there were other options. Apparently in Gujarat 
one method was to pay the army half in cash from the central 
treasury and half in permanent land grants.28 Such a method 
could perhaps create nobles who were both dependent on the centre 
and yet also felt bound to defend an area in "'{hich they had a 
permanent stake. " 
Land was not a uniform commodity in Mughal India. Rather 
it was carefully and consciously graded in accordance with its 
fertility and also the docility of the local peasants. Thus, as we 
noted, more powerful nobles got more turbulent areas as jagirs. 
These differences could be used to punish a noble, and on the 
other hand led to considerable discontent among the nobility. 
A jagirdar assigned a turbulent area could find himself forced 
to hire temporary troops in order to collect his revenue. Thus 
his net receipts fell, and he had less money with which to pay 
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his own permanent troops.29 Nobles whose loyalty was suspect 
would, ironically, be given jagirs close to the centre and on the 
plains. Jai Singh advised Aurangzeb that if Sivaji's son 'be granted 
a jagir in Aurangabad, it would be politic, as the resumption or 
continuation of the jagir would be in our power.' At this same 
time (1665) when the Mughals took by treaty many of Sivaji's 
forts, they kept for themselves the difficult ones in the mountains. 
Sivaji was left with indefensible forts and land on the plains. 30 
An expanding empire had obvious advantages for both nobles 
and emperor. For the latter, an increase in land under his central 
authority obviously increased his power. Further, tensions within 
the nobility could be relieved by sending off restless nobles to 
conquer somewhere. Once achieved, the new area would be divided 
up into jagirs and allocated to deserving nobles, or kept as khalisa. 
For the nobles there were also advantages. A noble engaged in 
conquest felt himself to be fulfilling his duty, to be fitly engaged 
in a culturally sanctioned activity. While he conquered, the emperor 
would keep up his contingents and reward him when he succeeded. 
There was, however, a rather different sort of imperial 
expansion, one which was risky but potentially very advantageous. 
This was the practice of allocating a noble a jagir in as yet 
unsubdued territory, and in effect telling him if he wanted to 
be paid he had first to conquer.31 This practice seems to have 
declined in the seventeenth century; by this time a noble conquered 
an area under imperial direction and the area was then routinely 
allocated in jagirs. Making a noble conquer in order to be paid 
obviously put great strains on loyalty: why should a successful 
conquerer then turn around and meekly make the conquered area 
into jagir land? 
Land and its control and distribution was the crucial relationship 
between noble and emperor. There were however other areas 
of interaction, which were based on Mughal notions of their own 
status and prestige vis a vis the nobility. It seems that the Mughals 
were little affected by the dubious position of rulers in Islamic 
political theory.32 In part this was because they claimed to be 
something more than mere secular rulers anyway, but they also 
adopted and adapted Mongol ideas, seeing themselves then not 
as first among equals but very definitely as far superior to any 
person not of Mughal blood. Thus to marry one's female kin to 
a Mughal was a great honour for any noble, but Mughal women 
were married to Timurid or Safavid princes, to descendents of 
saints or the Prophet, to no one at all, but not to ordinary nobles.33 
In this context face to face contact was crucial. For the noble 
it was obviously advantageous to be seen by the emperor while 
engaged in some culturally valued activity. This could be a single 
handed heroic feat of arms, or general bravery, or the offering 
of a valued gift, or the apt capping of a couplet. The important 
thing was to make oneself known. In fact for the average mansabdar 
or aspiring ahadi ('gentleman-trooper') this was not just important, 
Mughal India 185 
it was essential for recruitment and then for promotion. A chief 
could in effect insist on being coopted because he controlled land 
and so had a more or less independent base. Non-chiefly nobles, 
the vast majority, were dependent on kin and patronage ties, and 
ultimately on personal favour. 
Personal contact was also a crucial mechanism used by the 
emperor to bond his nobles, and to reward and chastise them. 
A noble who refused a summons to court was ipso facto in revolt. 
Conversely, a noble who had failed was sent to a new posting 
without being allowed to come to court. The Mughals did this 
consciously. Hence their insistence that all nobles at the capital 
attend court twice daily. Hence Abul Fazl's claim that 'His Majesty 
s:ees through some men at the first glance and confers upon them 
high rank.!34 The face to face exchange of presents was part 
of the system, as were the formalized prostrations and the way 
nobles called themselves murid and the emperor pir-o-murshid. 
Various bodily substances were used to bind a noble to an 
emperor. An extreme, and very powerful, example was the real 
or symbolic breast milk of a Mughal woman. Much more routine 
WE.\S the use of robes of honour, and other articles from the body 
of the emperor. Robes (known as sar-o-pa, or khilat) were used 
in strictly graduated ways. On public occasions such as the 
emperor's birthday they were given out to everyone at court. 
It was much more powerful (because much more of the imperial 
bodily substance was transferred) to receive a robe which the 
emperor had himself worn. Still more powerful was an article 
of clothing removed fro1t1 next to the skin of the emperor, such 
as an undershirt. Most potent of all was an article of clothing 
or jewellery transferred from the head of the emperor.35 
This stress on contact and sight was clearly extremely 
persona1i2'.ed, and so was limited. In a large empire it was physically 
impossibl•~ for such a system to operate well: the larger the empire 
the greater the number of nobles and thus only the very top could 
be bonded in this way. Further; a large empire must include more 
and rnore diverse nobles, even primitives who did not accept or 
understand the whole underlying ethos, or who could not follow 
the elaborate ceremonial. Such people failed to win imperial 
favour,, but from the other perspective they also failed to be bonded. 
Sivaji illustrates both tendencies perfectly.36 
A final element in the noble-emperor equation was the 
composition of the nobility. Again there were various advantages 
and di,sadvantages to be weighed up. In the early thirteenth century 
Muhammad of Ghur used his so--called Slave Order, a fraternity 
of Turkish slaves trained by him, appointed by him, and in theory 
totall:y dependent on him. Yet their very homogeneity was a threat, 
for the Order became inbred and overlv cohesive for the safetv 
of thE! ruler. The Mughals preferred raci'ally and religiously divers~. 
noble~; who balanced each other and left the emperor unchallenged 
on to:p. Even these factions could at times curtail the imperial 
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freedom of action; again Sivaji provides an example, but there 
are many others. 37 A bickering nobility could be ineffective, 
but a united one could be threatening. 
The total picture is one of lack of independent power for the 
nobles vis a vis the emperors, indeed almost total subservience. 
The most dramatic illustration of this is seen in their general 
inability to employ the ultimate weapon of revolt. With very 
few, and unsuccessful, exceptions the non-landed nobles perforce 
remained loyal, for they had no base and no autonomous power. 
Even their own contingents were mixed ethnically,38 and were 
perhaps not totally loyal to or dependent on their nobles. Nobles 
could never participate in politics at the highest level - that is, 
decide who should rule while a monarch was alive and effective. 
It was only in the wars of succession that they participated in 
this ultimate ch.oice. Yet, most significantly, even here they 
acted not for themselves or their peers in an attempt to make 
a noble the emperor. They acted on behalf of whichever prince 
they were bound to by patronage ties or other bonds. Perhaps 
most revealing of all is the almost contemptuous way in which 
the ultimately victorious prince would let the defeated supporters 
of his rivals join up with his new regime. These nobles were no 
threat to a Mughal emperor, and had nowhere else to go. Yet 
this bleak picture must be tempered a little, for there were colossal 
rewards available to them. A loyal and successful noble controlled 
vast resources, a point recently stressed by S. Moosvi and J.F. 
Richards. 3 9 
Ruler and Chief Chiefs also never dreamed of becoming emperor, 
but because they controlled their own land they operated from 
a more powerful base, and posed different problems and 
opportunities to the Mughals. A case study will illustrate the 
mechanisms of control used. It concerns the Baghela rulers of 
the Bandhogarh area, in the southern part of Allahabad suba. The 
area was mostly covered in dense jungle. The terrain was difficult, 
and the Baghelas had a strong fort. At first they held the upper 
hand. They only reluctantly came to Akbar's court, and paid homage 
to him. He apparently tried to bond them by marriage alliances 
with noble families. Finally he seems to have lost patience. In 
1597 Mughal armies conquered the fort. A revolt in 1610 was 
crushed by the Mughal Rajput Raja Maha Singh, and Jahangir 
gave him the area in jagir as a reward. The Baghela raja was 
however confirmed as chief in his own area. Greater Mughal 
control was seen in 1634 when the Baghelas were used by Shah 
Jahan against the neighbouring refractory Bundela chiefs. In 
1655 the final submission occurred. At this time the position 
of the raja, attacked by the Bundelas and under suspicion at court, 
was weak. He was given a mansab and gifts, thus becoming part 
of the imperial service. His own area was retained, but now as 
his watan ('homeland') jagir, and so subject to imperial revenue 
regulations. The ruling family remained loyal and continued to 
receive mansabs, though not very large ones. 40 Once such people 
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had been absorbed they posed no threat and minor appointments 
were enough to retain their loyalty. 
From the imperial side, not all chiefs were worth bothering 
about. Those in remote, unproductive or non-strategic areas could 
be ignored. On the other hand, some chiefs needed to be defeated 
because of their threat and power. The question then became 
whether to' incorporate them in the nobility, or simply dispossess 
them, or reduce their status to that of an intermediary. The Raj puts 
were usually incorporated but until the 1680s there was no attempt 
to dispossess them. In fact their attraction to the Mughals - their 
kin followings, their martial prowess - was also their safeguard. 
Better a scourge to be used against others than a thorn in one's 
own breast. Consequently, those Rajputs who submitted early 
to Akbar and possessed these other two qualities did well under 
the Mughals, notably the Kachhawas of Amber. On the other 
hand, as noted, in the heartland imperial power was greater, and 
independent chiefs less tolerable, so they were mostly dispossessed. 
There were however other variables. In particular, A.R. Khan 
points to a distinction between tribal chiefs, their power based 
on kin, and territorial chiefs whose power base was more diffuse. 41 
He fails to spell out the implications of this potentially important 
distinction, but possibly the career of Raj Singh, tile Sisodian 
Rajput ruler of Mewar, illustrates this point. The Sisodians appear 
to have been less exclusive and factionalised, and so were supported 
by more local elements· in their area, than were some neighbouring 
Rajput ruling families. Thus Raj Singh operated from an 
exceptionally strong local power base. Yet he could only go so 
far. Early in his reign, in 1654, he acted too independently and 
was chastised bv Shah Jahan. From this he learnt to balance. 
On the one hand" he sent his sons to court as tokens of submission, 
and generally took care not to challenge the Mughals. On the 
other hand, although he accepted a high mansab he never fought 
for the Mughals, he never went to court, and his clan never offered 
princesses to the l\1ughals.4~ Nevertheless, the Mughals apparently 
considered him to be loyal enough, and did not try to force him 
to be incorporated more completely. 
The i\lughals used several finely graded mechanisms to 
inc01•porate a chief. At one extreme a chief gave his daughter 
to a Mughal, and got for himself a mansab and a jagir. His homeland 
became watan-jagir, and so subject to imperial revenue regulations. 
Other variants included being required to do military service for 
the Mughals, but only in one's own area, as opposed to making 
one's troops available for distant operations. Whether or not one 
paid personal homage was, in light of the earlier aiscussion of 
bonding, crucial. Some chiefs came personally, but only had 
interviews with a prince. Some married their daughters to the 
emperor, some to princes, and some only to nobles. On the other 
hand, some chiefs sent as token of submission only their son, or 
even only a functionary in their state. The amount, and regular·ity, 
of tribute payment was important, but any amount was better 
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than having one's area become watan-jagir, that is, having peshkash 
(tribute) replaced by a payment of revenue based on land production. 
Another mechanism was the holding of hostages at court. A 
chief's daughter or sister married to a prince was a tacit hostage 
for the good behaviour of the male relation. Perhaps more 
important, the Mughal's claimed paramountcy over the chiefly 
areas, and especially the right to determine succession to the 
gaddi (throne). True, the choice of the clan elders was usually 
accepted, but the threat was always at least potential, and more 
than once actual. The Mughals could also attempt to destabilize 
a chief by opening relations with his own dependent sub-chiefs. 
Many chiefs willingly accepted the ·Mughal embrace, for this 
way lay greater power. Thus in 1666 the Rajput Jai Singh and 
the Maratha Sivaji combined to attack Bijapur. Both gained from 
participating in this imperial effort. Jai Singh as an independent 
Rajput ruler could not have hoped to operate so far afield, while 
Sivaji, thanks to Mughal help, could plunder more effectively 
than usual. For some chiefs, their revenue from jagirs was greater 
than that from their homelands. Many chiefs thus did not need 
to be defeated; Mughal enticements were sufficient, and the chiefs 
were the suitors. Further, Mughal prestige with the Rajputs was 
such that their acceptance meant an increase of power at home, 
especially as Mughal legitimation could be backed up with force. 
Chiefs recognized by the Mughals were less dependent on local 
clan and kin ties, and jagir income could be used to buy more 
local support. Raj Singh chose to stay out, but most wanted to 
come in. 
Nevertheless, the chiefs did often have options of sorts. They 
could offer only passive allegiance, and ultimately they could 
revolt. True, while the empire functioned the revolts were sooner 
or later defeated, but at least, thanks to their landed base, this 
was an option. In this important, perhaps ultimate, area they 
had more autonomy and more choice than did the other nobles.43 
Mughal Thrusts The preceding discussion has stressed, in a mostly 
synchronic way, continuing emperor-noble relations, but we have 
seen hints already of a gradual increase in Mughal power, a slow 
bearing down on nobles and chiefs. We need now to consider other 
examples of this slow accretion of imperial power, and finally 
investigate particular, more sudden, Mughal thrusts. 
We shall consider first wider Mughal ideas about their role 
in society. Most writers seem to agree that a premodern Muslim 
ruler might give charity and provide social services, but only as 
a rich and pious individual, not as a head of a government which 
had welfare obligations. Habib and A thar Ali both stress the limited 
role of the government in this area. Thus Shah Jahan's canals 
were dug for royal, not developmental, purposes. There was some 
famine relief, and grants of land to scholars, but the general 
attitude was hands off.44 
This depiction seems to stress practice, not theory or aspiration. 
Mughal India 189 
The Mughals seemed to want to do more, or appear to be doing 
more. This can be seen in the important matter of control over 
land (remembering again the fundamental fact that more land 
under imperial control meant more surplus for the emperor to 
extract). The state tried to extend areas under cultivation. Loans 
were given for developmental purposes, such as for wells and 
dams. Gr&duated concessions on the revenue demand were offered 
for five years to those who brought new land under cultivation. 
Conversely, peasants were forbidden to leave their land, and 
absconding peasants were either forced or induced to come back. 
In one area R.l and expenses was offered to those who returned.45 
Indeed, zamindars seem to have competed for peasants, treating 
them well so they would stay, and trying to inveigle them to desert 
other zamindars. The odd men out here were the jagirdars, who 
with short tenures presumably were not so concerned about this. 
But for the empire, and all sorts of zamindars, peasants were 
a commodity of prime importance. 
A related method of extending land under cultivation was 
the system of madad-i-ma'ash land grants. These were usually 
hereditary and were given to deserving scholars, divines (not 
necessarily Muslims), and retired officials for their subsistence. 
The total area was not large, but the significant point is that 
these grants were usually given to land which was cultivable but 
not yet cultivated, or, according to another source, in areas half 
of which were settled and half waste. Frequently they were located 
in zor talab areas. The advantages are obvious for the state. 
More land was brought under cultivation, and a locally-based, 
totally dependent, rural class created. As a bonus, a reputation 
for piety was acquired. True, these grantees kept the revenue 
of the area for themselves, but even so their areas were made 
more secure, and the amount of land ultimately at the disposal 
of the emperor was increased. As creatures of the emperor, and 
his apologists and propagandists, these were ideal people to have 
in border or turbulent areas. Eaton has shown that even sufis 
could be warriors: Jahanglr was not thinking only of divine help 
when he called his grantees his 'Army of Prayer.•46 
Two comparable on-going processes may also be noted. First, 
in the seventeenth century the salary of a noble's contingent was 
reduced, and due to various changes in methods of payment the 
net income of the nobility under Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb also 
declined.47 Second, according to Nurul Hasan the Mughals tried 
to get even primary zamindars (presumably only the larger ones 
who controlled several villages and were located in the Doab) 
to register their transfer deeds with state appointed qazis.48 
The success of this attempt was probably very limited, but it 
points to a desire to extend imperial cognizance, but presumably 
not control, to a very low level in rural society. 
The Mughals made several other, more abrupt, attempts to 
extend and intensify their control over land and resources. The 
well-known wars of expansion, a constant in Mughal history, are 
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obvious examples. More interesting are efforts to reduce the 
power of the two groups above the intermediary zamindars and 
below the emperor, the nobles and the chiefs. We can first consider 
Mughal behavior when they conquered an area. The pattern is 
very much of a rapid and thorough shakeup in which attempts 
were made to reduce the power of chiefs and increase the flow 
of revenue to the centre. Todar Mal spent six months in Gujarat 
in 1573, and assessed, using measurement, 64 out of 198 parganas, 
essentially those in the fertile lowlands. In these areas revenue 
was to be at a fixed rate, for ten years, based on the area and 
quality of land held; this system was later applied in the 
heartland. 49 When Akbar conquered Khandesh the revenue demand 
went up 50 percent. In Hyderabad in 1689-90 a settlement was 
done down to pargana level, and selective increases in demand 
of an average of 13 percent were imposed. 50 
A more dramatic example comes from Rajasthan in the famous 
revolt of 1679 onwards. Jaswant Singh, ruler of Marwar, died 
without heirs, though two of his queens were pregnant. Leaving 
aside the details, Aurangzeb's actions now show a clear desire 
to use this golden opportunity to subordinate a part of Rajasthan. 
He appointed his own nominee as the new raja, and brought Jodhpur 
state, the central part of Marwar, under direct imperial control. 
His aim was in fact to absorb Marwar and reduce the independence 
of neighbouring Mewar. In this he was largely, if temporarily, 
successful. Initially he faced various localized revolts, testimony 
to the difficulties in the transition from living under a chief to 
living in jagir land. But ultimately the rebels all sued for mansabs 
and pardon. This success, presumably a portent for the future, 
was of course nullified by the contemporary problems in the 
Deccan. 51 
The Rajputs as particularly powerful chiefs and mansabdars 
had in fact been under covert attack for some time. Their problem 
was that they had been bonded so successfully they could hardly 
move. They needed the empire far more than the emperor needed 
them. Using Athar Ali's division of Aurangzeb's reign into two 
periods, 1658-78 and 1679-1707, we find that of all the nobles 
whom he lists as zamindars (essentially holders of watan jagirs), 
in the first period 83.7 percent of the zats (personal ranks) of 
such people were held by Rajputs, and 11.33 percent by Marathas 
and Deccanis. But Aurangzeb wanted tci use his resources to buy 
these last two groups, while he correctly saw that he could ignore 
the Rajputs. Thus in the second period, the Rajput proportion 
of zats of all zamindari nobles fell to 58.2 percent, while the 
Marathas and Deccanis rose to 32.33 percent. Aurangzeb was 
trying to incorporate the southerners. Once this was achieved 
he could then swallow them completely, just as he was close to 
doing with the Rajputs. 
A century earlier, there are signs of a general thrust by the 
emperor Akbar in the 1570s. First, and most interesting, was 
his so-called karori experiment, carried out in 1574-75 and including 
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the whole empire except Gujarat, Bengal and Bihar, which had 
all been conquered very recently. The idea was to remove all 
the jagirdars and, for revenue purposes, divide up the whole empire 
into equal areas directly subordinate to the crown. In each of 
these areas an official called a karori was to collect land revenue 
and send it to the centre. Nobles were all to be paid in cash from 
the proceeds of these collections. Other reforms included a 
reorganization of the provincial divisions of the empire, the 
introduction of branding of horses so nobles' contingents could 
be checked, the ten year land revenue settlement of 1580, and 
the so-called Infallibility Decree of 1579, the significance of which 
has recently been greatly downplayed. 
These reforms amounted to the most massive thrust ever 
attempted by a Mughal ruler. They were in fact too massive, 
for they produced the widespread revolt of 1580-83. Two significant 
events occurred during this revolt which show clearly what was 
botherir.g the nobles. One high official on his own authority gave 
back jagirs to the nobles in order to avoid an immediate rebellion. 
The main agent used by Akbar to implement these reforms was 
a high official called Shah Mansur. He was framed by evidence 
concocted by some of the highest nobles, and executed as a rebel, 
much to the delight of the other nobles.52 
The nobles apparently realised the implications of an extension 
of khalisa land, which essentially would have reduced their prestige 
and already limited room for manoevre. It is questionable whether 
salaried nobles would have fought so well to protect land over 
which they now had no· control at all; perhaps for this reason, 
and also because of the revolt, the karori experiment was dropped. 
Habib in fact claims it was meant to be only temporary, but this 
seems unlikely, only a rationale to disguise the backtracking. 
Certainly later Mughals continued to thrust in this area. Not 
only was khalisa land usually the best land, but the area of khalisa 
rose. In the late 1580s one quarter of the total assessed revenue 
of the three heartland provinces of Delhi, Oudh and Allahabad 
was in khalisa. Under Jahangir it fell dramatically, apparently 
to below 5 percent in the whole empire. The more efficient and 
ruthless Shah Jahan raised it to one fifteenth by his fourth year, 
and later to one eleventh. The proportion later declined a little, 
presumably as Shah Jahan's ambitions slackened, but by Aurganzeb's 
tenth year it was up to one fifth. In fact, the receipts from khalisa 
land under Aurangzeb in his thirty-fifth year were one third higher 
than for Shah Jahan's thirty-first year. 53 
Aurangzeb's true intentions were shown in his incorporation 
of Jodhpur into the khalisa, and his behaviour in the Deccan after 
the conquest of Golconda. Despite a serious shortage of land 
available to be assigned to jagirdars, he elected to keep 44 percent 
of receipts from land in Hyderabad in khalisa and so directly under 
his own control. 54 
If this interpretation of Mughal policy as one of almost constant 
192 Feudalism 
searching for weak points, of every opportunity for greater imperial 
power being taken, is a true one then it has important implications 
for our whole view of the nature of the Mughal ethos. Far from 
being ·constr·ained by Islamic theory, they actively tried to extend 
their power within a defined area of society. What is needed 
now is much closer research into their 'mentality' and their actions. 
Two preliminary points can be made about these attempts 
at greater control. First, they did not extend very far down into 
rural society. The end seems to have been the intermediary 
zamindars. Thus they represent essentially a juggling, a struggling 
for position, in levels of society above the intermediary zamindars. 
Second, these attempts do seem to have aimed not just at positional 
change, but at real structural change in the position and power 
of the elite. The ultimate aim was to change radically the character 
of the nobles and chiefs, to reduce their power, and replace them, 
or transform them into officials paid in cash and totally dependent 
on the emperor. It is true that this would have involved only 
enlarging already existing classes, for there were already some 
nobles paid in cash from the centre, and a standing central army. 
Nevertheless, when all were paid in cash, and no one had contingents 
of his own, this would have created a situation radically different 
from what has been seen as the classic Mughal system, for it would 
have been essentially a change from a quasi-patrimonial to a fully 
prebendal system. Such a system would probably have tended 
towards an orientation. and ethos closer to that of a modern 
bureaucracy, completely subordinate not to a parliament or other 
representative body but to a genuinely autocratic Mughal emperor. 
The difficulties of such a transition, indeed radical change, are 
shown in the very small success achieved. It is, in any case, most 
doubtful that any emperor had any clear design in his mind. Rather, 
as with any other ruler, he groped towards closer control and 
more power, with only minimal success. Technological barriers 
were especially important, and finally the probings produced a 
reaction in such events as the Rajput Revolt and the Maratha 
rebellion which contributed, with other factors, to the fall of 
the empire. Such a transformation might have saved the dynasty, 
had it been achieved, but it can be doubted whether in fact this 
or anv other basic transformation was possible in 
sevente~nth-century India. 
Instead, the structure of power in Mughal India remained 
relatively constant. A powerful emperor impinged most directly 
on that majority of his nobles who had no landed base and therefore 
no possibility of independent power. These nobles were enormously 
wealthy, and greatly subservient to their emperor. Nobles who 
were also chiefs (less than 20 percent of the total) had more, 
though still limited, independence. Their advantage, the possession 
of a landed base, was largely nullified by imperial power and policy. 
Emperor, nooles, and their clients made up the ruling group in 
the empire. While the emperor's control over this group was nearly 
total. the group's impact on the rest of Mughal India was slight 
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in the extreme. The only recurring relationship between ruler 
a.nd subject was the collection of land revenue. This was mediated 
through the notoriously refractory intermediary zamindars. Below 
them were the great mass of the population, in no way concerned 
with or affected by the ambitions or policies of the emperors. 
The contrast with the many variants of feudalism are plain to 
see. Compared with classic feudalism, this political system was 
rnore centralised at the peak, and much more autonomous and 
disaggregated below this small elite. A glittering array of nobles 
danced attendance on the emperor, but their shadow lay light 
over the rest of India. 
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